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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
ED B. SHRIVER, et al, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
I. G. BENCH, 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts made by petitioners in their brief 
is generally acceptable. However, we deem it helpful to 
state more fully the salary and other changes the proposed 
initiative ordinance would make. Also some additional 
statements should be made concerning the adoption of the 
"Council-Manager Charter" by the citizens of Provo. 
The proposed ordinance seeks to amend Title 1-0-16(o) 
Revised Ordinances of Provo City, 1949, as amended in 1954 
and 1955. Section 1 amends 1-0-16(o) in the second para-
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graph thereof ·by substituting for the last three words of 
same "board of commissioners" the ·words "Provo City Coun-
cil.'' The pay range table of said section is unchanged, but 
there is added thereto a proviso fixing minimum salaries 
for the Provo Police Department and Provo Fire Depart-
ment from the sixth grade up to the first and ranging from 
$3,540.00 to $4,740.00. It further provides that after one 
year's service the police or the .firemen move automatically 
up to the next grade. Upon the ordinance taking effect, 
without any examination the police or the fireman shall 
start to receive "the annual salaries as their total number 
of years with their respective department calls for." A 
uniform allowance, in addition to salary, in the sum of $15.00 
is provided for each offi·cer. The proposed ordinance fur-
ther provides for a cost of living adjustment to the above 
mentioned salaries. The salary is tied to the 1957 level of 
the B.L.S. Consumer Price Index. As this index goes up, 
so do the wages, at $2.00 per month. There is also a de-
crease provision, but it is not as liberal. There is a provi-
sion as to what happens in the event the B.L.S. Consumer 
Price Index is discontinued. 
At a special election held in August, 1955, the citizens 
of Provo, pursuant to Section 5 of Article XI of the Con-
stitution of Utah, adopted the "Council-Manager Charter'' 
of Provo City, Utah, to become effective January 1, 1956, 
hereinafter referred to as the Charter. Certified, authenti-
cated copies thereof were thereafter duly filed in the respec-
tive offices of the Secretary of State and City Recorder. 
Since January 1, 1956, its effective date, the Charter has 
been in full force and effect, and it is required by the afore-
said constitutional provision that "all courts shall take ju-
dicial notice of such charter." For convenience of the Court 
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3 
we attach to this brief an official copy of the Charter so 
that references thereto can be readily identified. 
In our opinion, the issues to be determined by this ~court 
in the ease at bar are as follows: 
1. Under general Utah law, is the fixing of salaries 
of municipal officers, including police and firemen, an ad-
minisrative function not subject to the initiative law? 
2. Under the provisions of the ~Charter, is the fixing 
of salaries of municipal officers, including police and fire-
men, an adminisrative function not referable to the voters 
under the initiative law? 
3. Does the proposed ordinance constitute an attempt 
to attack the Charter collaterally in the matter orf fixing 
salaries? 
We believe that the general law regarding the fixing 
of salaries of municipal officers, including police and fire-
men, is an administrative matter, and when the Provo Char-
ter provisions are added there can be no doubt about it. 
In either event, the initiative law ean have no application. 
In support of our position, we make the following points: 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE PEOPLE OF PR0'V10' HIA VE THE UNQUES-
TIONED RIGHT TO INV10KE THE POWERS O~F INITIA-
TIVE AND REFERENDUM IN CONNECTION WITH 
ACTS WHICH ARE LEGISLATIVE IN c·HARACTER, 
BUT NOT AS TQ1 ACTS WHICH ARE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE IN CHARACTER. 
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POINT II 
THE PROPOSED ORDINANCE WOUlD HAVE ·PRO-
VO CITIZENS ACT TO RAISE PROVO POLICE AND 
FIREMEN'S SALARIES AND SUCH ACTION IS AD-
MINISTRATIVE IN CHARACTER, AND CONSEQUENT-
LY THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM LAW IS 
NOT APPLICABLE. 
POINT ITI 
IN ANY EVENT, THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRO-
VO CITY CHARTER MAKE THE FIXING OF SALARIES 
FOR MUNICIPAL OFFICERS, INCLUDING POLICE 
AND FIREMEN, AD:MINISTRATIVE IN CHARACTER 
AND SUCH ACTION IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE INITIA-
TIVE AND REFERENDUM LAW. 
POINT N 
THE A'ITEMPT MADE BY THE PROPOSED ORDI-
NANCE TO RAISE THE SALARIES OF THE POLICE 
AND FIREMEN OF PROVO CITY, WITHOUT FffiST 
COMPLYING WITH ARTICLE 7 OF THE PROVO CITY 
CHARTER, CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK 
U)PON THE CHARTER WinCH IS THE ORGANIC LAW 
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PROVO CITY. 
THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PEOPLE OF PROVO 1M VE THE UNQUES-
TIONED RIGHT TO INVOKE THE POWERS OF INITIA-
TIVE AND REFERENDUM IN CONNECTION WITH 
ACTS WHICH ARE LEGISLATIVE IN CHARACTER, 
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BUT NOT AS TO ACTS WHICH ARE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE IN CHARACTER. 
Our concern here is not so much the liberal -construc-
tion of the initiative and referendum law, as it is the appli-
cability of the same to the case at bar. It has already been 
construed by this Court as inapplicable to administrative 
matters, as the petitioners very properly concede. It is 
true that in Article 10, Section 1, of the Oharter, Provo 
citizens ". . . reserve to themselves the powers of ini-
tiative and referendum to be exercised in the manner pre-
scribed by general law." The general Utah law referred 
to in this Charter provision is embodied in Chapter 11, Title 
20, U. C. A., 1953, which petitioners seek to invoke. Section 
20-11-21 thereof provides as follows: 
"Subject to the provisions of this chapter, legal 
voters of any city or town, in such numbers as herein 
required, may initiate any desired legislation and cause 
the same to be submitted to the law-making body, or to 
a vote of the people of such city or town for approval 
or rejection, or may require any law or ordinance 
passed by the law-making body of such city or town 
to be submitted to the voters thereof before such law 
or ordinance shall take effect." 
In Keigley vs. Bench, 97 Utah 69, 89 P2d 482, 122 A. 
L. R. 756, this section was held to be applicable only to such 
laws, ordinances or motions that are legislative in character, 
and does not apply to those adminisrative in character. The 
provisions of the proposed ordinance in the Keigley case, 
refunding bonds authorized by a previous ordinance, chang-
ing dates of the bonds, and the date of principal and in-
terest payments, were held to be administrative in their 
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nature and not subject to referendum, but the provisions 
extending the plan of refunding from the fifteen year period 
to a twenty year period was held to be legislative in its 
nature and required submission to the electorate. 
This Court, in the Keigley case, says at page 761 A. 
L. R.: 
" . The reason for such rule is well stated in 
the Dooling case, supra: 'As a matter of practical ad-
ministration of municipal affairs this interpretation is 
the only one which would render the referendum a 
workable measure. If every dissatisfied bidder or dis-
appointed applicant for municipal work could invoke 
the machinery of the referendum of the statute, there-
by suspending the taking effect of the measure thus 
assailed, efficiency and economy in the business ad-
ministration of a city would be seriously affected. This 
consideration has led courts of some other jurisdic-
tions to go far in restricting municipal referendum to 
legislative acts.' 
To hold otherwise would so seriously interfere with 
municipal government and administration that we could 
not espouse the view without explicit statutory pro-
nouncement, despite the ~holdings or intimations of some 
jurisdictions extending the referendum into actions of 
an administrative character. . . . " 
Since the Keigley case was decided in 1939, the Legis-
lature has met 9 times, and apparently seen no reason to 
amend the statute to change the Court's ruling. 
If the proposed ordinance in the case at bar is adminis-
trative in its character, and we believe that it is, it does not 
come ·within the purview of the initiative and referendum 
law of this state and is not subject thereto, as was decided 
by the Keigley case. 
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POINT II 
THE PRO·POSED ORDINANCE WOUlD HAVE PRO-
VO CITIZENS ACT TO RAISE PR0'V0 POLICE AND 
FIREMEN'S SALARIES AND SUCH ACTIO~N IS AD-
MINISTRATIVE IN ·CHARACTER, AND CONSEQUENT-
LY THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM LAW IS 
NOT APPLlCABLE. 
Although there is a division of judicial authority, we 
assert with assurance, that measures involving the matter 
of salary increases for municipal officers, including police 
and firemen, are administrative in characte·r and the initia-
tive and referendum law is not applicable. The situation 
is well summed up in the annotation 122 A. L. R. 769 at 
page 782 as follows: 
"Logically, it would seem that as a general propo-
sition ordinances dealing with the fixing of salaries of 
municipal officers and employees other than those s~ 
cifically provided for by law are merely administra-
tive in character as being subject to change depending 
on length and quality of service, and other circumstan-
ces of fact, and therefore outside the operation of ini-
tiative and referendum proi\Tisions. However, the de-
cided cases are in confusion on the subject, and it seems 
impractical to atempt to reconcile them, or to make 
any distinctions orther than those which may appear 
in setting out the reasoning and conclusions of the court 
in each case, and the particular statutory provisions 
involved." 
The following cases support the rule that ordinances 
fixing the salaries of municipal officers are administrative 
in character and therefore are not subject to the initiative 
and referendum law: 
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In Murphy vs. Gilman, 204 Iowa 58, 214 N. W. 679, 
the Sioux City, Iowa, officials refused to pay increased fire-
men's wages required by an ordinance passed under the 
initiative procedure. Mandamus was sought to compel them 
to pay, and they contended that the subject matter of the 
ordinance is not one within the purview of the initiative and 
referendum statute, because (1) the fixing of salaries of 
firemen is not required to be by ordinance; and (2) it is an 
administrative act, and those statutes apply only to legis-
lative acts of the city. The Iowa law provides that the right 
of initiative and referendum shall apply only to an ordi-
nance. The court further limited its exercise to ordinances 
which were legislative in function. The court sustained 
both the grounds upon which the city officials defended, 
saying at pp. 681 and 682 N. W. Report: 
"The establishment of a fire department is doubt-
less a legislative act, and such as is required to be by 
ordinance. It is legislation of a permanent character. 
But the fixing of the compensation to be paid its mem-
bers is a matter of administrative exercise of power. 
What is a proper compensation may depend upon many 
changing conditions, which have to be met from time 
to time, and may properly be provided for in a less per-
manent way than by ordinance." 
"Our conclusion is that the fixing of the compen-
sation of firemen was an exercise of the administrative 
function of the city, and, in the absence of a statutory 
requirement that it be done by ordinance, was not an 
act to which the initiative and referendum applied, and 
that the ordinance in question is therefore invalid." 
In Holvey vs. Kapp, 355 Ill. 596, 189 N. E. 920, the 
council of Springfield City refused to pass an ordinance in· 
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creasing the salaries of firemen, or to submit it to the city 
voters under the initiative proceding, and the citizens 
brought this mandamus proceeding to compel them to do so. 
The writ was granted by the lower court and the city offi-
cials appealed. The question presented on the appeal is: 
Are the people of a municipality operating under the com-
mission form of municipal government act empowered to 
initiate an ordinance fixing the salaries of the city firemen? 
The Illinois statute provides that any proposed ordinance 
can be brought before the council and be submitted by it to 
the electors under initiative procedure. Other sections of 
the illinois law authorize the council to fix the compensa-
tion of all appointive officers or employees "by resolution 
or otherwise," ·while all other officers, assistants, or em-
ployees, shall receive such compensation as the council shall 
provide '~by ordinance." The court then goes on to review 
and construe these and other sections of the statute, includ-
ing those which classify the municipal operatives into vari-
ous groups. The court also reviews Muvphy vs. Gilman, 
supra, and follows it in this decision. In reversing the de-
cision and denying the writ, the court had the following to 
say at page 924 N. E. Report: 
"As a resolution does not connote permanency, we 
cannot escape the conclusion that the fixing of salaries 
of the employees in the Springfield Fire Department 
was an executive or administrative act and not legis-
lative in character. It was therefore not a proper sub-
ject for regulation by the electorate, as it is quite gen-
erally held in this country that the power to initiate 
legislation under statutes providing for the initiative 
and referendum in the conduct of municipal affairs can-
not extend to such functions of city government as are 
purely administrative in character." 
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"In other words, the legislature has allowed the 
council to determine the form of its action. The form 
of action taken, whether by ordinance, resolution, or 
motion, is relatively unimportant. The subject of the 
action, whether legislative or administrative in char-
acter, is all important and determines the applicability 
of section 47 (section 312). If the subject is legisla-
tive, its ptwpose can only be accomplished by ordinance, 
and the electorate, under section 47, is given power to 
initiate it, but not otherwise." 
In McElroy vs. Hartsfield, 185 Ga. 264, 194 S. E. 737, 
the suit is to compel the ·city officials to pay plaintiff the 
salary specified in an initiated ordinance fixing salaries for 
firemen. The court held that the ordinance was invalid 
for the reason that the initiative and referendum provisions 
of the charter, under which the city was operating, were 
not intended by the legislature to apply to fiscal matters 
provided for in other sections of the charter whereby the 
council and other officers were made responsible for ap-
propriations in excess of income. To allow initiative or 
referendum in such matters, stated the court, would place 
it in the power of the electorate to disrupt and destroy the 
system of fiscal management set up by the legislature for 
the city, and by their acts force an excess of expenditures 
over income, when the electorate were in no wise themselves 
under any official responsibility. 
In view of the fact that the state of Washington is one 
of the states holding against our contention, it is quite natu-
ral that Payne vs. City of Spokane, 134 P2d 950, should re-
main in line with the Washington decisions. However, we 
disagree with counsel in their brief when they conclude that 
it is our position "that fixing of salaries might be legisla .. 
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tive in nature yet under the particular provisions of the 
Provo ·City Charter it becomes an administrative function," 
and that the Payne case is a complete answer to this ques-
tion. Our reading of the Payne case discloses that the pro-
posed ordinance increasing the pay of members of the fire 
department was held to be legislative and subject to the 
initiative and referendum law, because the provisions of 
that city charter made it so. These provisions are found in 
the following quotations from the case setting forth the 
provisions of the charter, at page 951 Pac. Reports: 
". . . The clerk, as required by subd. (b) of 
Section 82, Art. IX (providing for the initiative) of the 
city charter, certified the sufficiency of the petition 
and presented it to the city council. Subdivision (c) 
of that section provides: '* * * the council, within 
ten (10) days after the receipt thereof, except as other-
wise provided in this charter, shall either pass such 
ordinance without alteration, or submit it to a popular 
vote at a special election which must be held within 30 
days after the date of the ordering thereof. * * * ' 
. . . Art. IV, Section 2'6, of the charter, which pro-
vides: 'Employees, Compensation: The council shall 
fix the compensation of all officers assistants and em-
ployees, and may change the same.' . . . Art. I, 
Section 4, of the charter, which provides: 'Powers, 
How Exercised: All power of the city, unless other-
wise provided in this charter, shall be exercised by, 
through and under the direction of five eommissioners, 
who shall constitute the ·council and one of whom shall 
be the mayor. The commissioners and council shall be 
subject to the control and direction of the people at 
all times, by the initiative referendum and recall, pro-
vided for in this charter.'" 
It is submitted that there are no such provisions in the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
Provo City Charter and the Payne case is far removed from 
applicability to the facts of the ·case at bar. 
Counsel in their brief lay stress on two California cases 
decided by the District Court of Appeals as being precedents 
in support of their position. It is our contention that these 
cases do not support counsel's claim. In Spencer vs. City of 
Alhambra, 44 Cal. App. 2d 75, 111 P2d 910, the electors of 
the City of Alhambra adopted an initiative ordinance es-
tablishing a scale of minimum salaries for members of the 
city's police department. The legislative body, known as 
the commission, of said city, refused to give effect to the 
provisions of the ordinance, contending that the fixing of 
minimum salaries for police officers was not subject to vote 
by the people, and was beyond and in excess of the initia-
tive powers of the electors under the terms of the city char-
ter. Mandamus of the city commission to put the ordinance 
into effect was sought and resisted by the city. From a 
judgment directing issuance of the writ the city appealed. 
The District Court of Appeals, Second District, Division 1, 
California, affirmed the decision of the lower court. It 
should be pointed out that this decision went the way it did, 
not because the court held the salary ordinance to be legis-
lative in character and not administrative, but because of 
the provisions of the Alhambra City Charter, which follow, 
at page 912 Pac. Report: 
"Article XIII, Section 78, of the Alhambra city 
charter reads: 'The commission, subject to the pro-
visions of this charter, shall have power to organize 
the police division and change the same and make all 
necessary rules and regulations for its efficient admin-
istration, ordain penalties for violation thereof, estab-
lish the number of its members and the amount of their 
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salaries, including that of the chief of police, and do all 
other acts necessary to the efficient equipment and 
operation of the police division of the city.' 
"Article VII, Section 60, of the same charter con-
tains the following language: 'The qualified electors 
of the city shall have power through the initiative or 
otherwise, as provided by this charter and the general 
laws of the state, to enact appropriate legislation to 
carry out and enforce any of the general powers of the 
city or any of the specified powers of the commission.''' 
Obviously, the court's decision was rested upon this basis 
as appears from the following concluding language of the 
court at page 913 Pac. Report: 
"From the foregoing it is at once apparent that 
the charter of the City of Alhambra has reserved to 
the electors the broadest possible powers in the matter 
of initiative legislation; powers so extensive as to per-
mit adoption by the voters of any ordinance which the 
commission might enact (Section 176, Art. XXIII), as 
well as to carry out and enforce any of the general pow-
ers of the city or any of the specified powers of the 
commission. The power to fix salaries of its policemen 
is included both in the general powers of the city and 
is reserved among the specified powers of the commis-
sion. Also, the ordinance here under consideration 
qualifies as an act declaratory of a public purpose and 
the ways and means of its accomplishment, thereby 
bringing it within the purview of the legislative preroga-
tive. The initiative ordinance in question is therefore 
a valid exercise of the initiative powers vested in the 
electorate of the city." 
There are no such provisions touching upon the initia-
tive powers of the city council appearing in the Provo City 
Charter. 
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Collins vs. City and County of San Francisco, 112 Cal. 
App. 2d 719, 247 P2d 362, is another district court decision 
cited by counsel in their brief in support of their position. 
Here again the decision turned largely upon the specific 
provisions of that ·city charter with respect to the use of 
the initiative procedure in connection with fixing the salary 
of municipal officers, which in this case were the policemen. 
Counsel in their brief cite Mitchell vs. Walker, 295 P2d 
90, as a decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Cali-
fornia giving approval to the Alhambra and City of San 
Francisco cases. The Mitchell case was a mandamus pro-
ceeding brought to compel the city council to submit to vote 
of the electorate of the city, an initiative ordinance which 
had been submitted to defendants and which they had re-
fused to adopt. The District Court of Appeals held that the 
effect of the proposed ordinance, requiring Monrovia city 
council to increase or decrease salaries of policemen and 
firemen in an amount equal to percentage of increase or 
decrease applied to members of comparable rank of Los 
Angeles County Sheriff's office and the Los Angeles Coun-
ty Fire Department, would be to delegate to the governing 
body of another political subdivision of the state (board of 
supervisors of Los Angeles County) power vested in the 
council to fix the salaries in question, and held that there-
fore the ordinance was not one which could be adopted by 
means of the initiative. 
The decision in the Mitchell case is based upon the 
delegation of powers point, but the court had the following 
to say on the administrative ordinance not being subject to 
initiative point, at page 92, Pac. Report: 
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"There is some question as to whether or not in 
exercising this power and performing this duty the 
coun·cil acts in an administrative or executive capacity 
rather than in a legislative one. In Spencer v. City of 
Alhambra, supra, and in ·Collins vs. City and County 
of San Francisco, supra, it is held that a City C'ouncil, 
in fixing salaries of officers and employees, acts in a 
legislative capacity. In both of these eases, however, 
the court was considering action taken by the City 
Council in adopting ordinances and fixing salaries un-
der the provisions of the charters of the eities con-
cerned, and it appears to have been unnecessary in view 
of the charter provisions involved to decide whether or 
not the fixing of salaries was a legislative matter rather 
than an administrative one. On the other hand, in 
Simpson v. Hite, 36 Cal. 2d 125·, 222 P2d 225, the Su-
preme Court held that the supervisors of the County 
of Los Angeles, in performing a duty placed upon them 
by the legislature, were acting in an administrative 
rather than a legislative capacity and in the porform-
ance of that duty were not subject to control by the 
electorate through the initiative." 
Obviously, from the foregoing review of the Washing-
ton and California cases, it appears that these decisions 
were made allowing the application of the initiative proced-
ure to salary ordinances for municipal officers, largely be-
cause of the specific provisions of city charters involved. 
POINT III 
IN ANY EVENT, THE PROVISIO·NS O·F THE PRO-
VO CITY CHARTER MAKE THE FIXING ·O·F SALARIES 
FOR MUNICIPAL ~OFFICERS, IN·CLUDING P·OLICE 
AND FIREMEN, ADMINISTRATIVE IN ·C·HARA,CTER 
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AND SUCH ACTION IS NOT s·uBJECT TO THE INITIA-
TIVE AND REFERENDUM LAW. 
We do not contend, as counsel claim in their brief, that 
the fixing of salaries might be legislative in nature. In-
deed, our contention is that such salary fixing ordinances 
by the governing body are administrative in nature and not 
subject to the initiative procedure, as held by Holvey vs. 
Kapp, supra, and Murphy vs. Gilman, supra. We do con-
tend, however, that all doubt about the character of such 
municipal action has been resolved in favor of it being ad-
ministrative in character by the adoption of the Provo City 
Charter. On this question, charter provisions were con-
trolling in the California and Washington cases above re-
ferred to. In the matter of invoking the initiative proced-
ure the Provo Charter makes the Utah law in that connec-
tion applicable. The Utah law permits the use of initiative 
and referendum procedures only as to measures which are 
legislative in character. What action of the council is leg-
islative in character and what is administrative in character 
is to be determined from the provisions of the Provo Char-
ter. To ascertain the intention of Provo citizens in this con-
nection it is necessary to examine briefly the pertinent char-
ter provisions. 
Section 1-2 of the Charter vests all powers of the city, 
limited only by the provisions of the State Constitution and 
this charter, in the "council, which shall enact local legis-
lation, adopt budgets, determine policies, and appoint the 
city manager, who shall execute the laws and administer 
the government of the city." These powers are to be exer-
cised only in the manner prescribed by the Charter and if 
the manner is not so prescribed then as prescribed by ordi-
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nance. The council is more particularly provided for in 
Article 2 of the Charter and its powers there reiterated 
(2-1). The ·Council appoints a city manager "who shall have 
the powers and perform the duties as provided in this char-
ter and by ordinance" (2-6). Section 2-7 empowers the 
council to remove the manager and Section 2-8 restricts 
the council from in any way interfering with personnel un-
der the city manager in the administrative service of the 
city. 
Article 3 of the Charter sets up the city manager as 
the chief administrative officer of the city, defines his quali-
fications, powers and duties, and provides that he shall ap-
point and remove city officers and employees, prepare the 
budget and the annual report, advise the council on the 
city's financial condition, "and perform such other duties 
as may be prescribed by this charter or required of him 
by the council, not inconsistent with this charter." Under 
Section 3-5 the city manager appoints department heads, but 
"may head one or more departments" himself. 
The city budget is provided for in Article 4 of the Char-
ter. The city manager is required to make the budget in 
accordance with these provisions, provide for public hear-
ings thereon and to submit same to the council for action. 
After hearings, amendments, and adoption the budget be-
comes the strict measure of income and expenditures to be 
made by the city during the fiscal year. Section 4-11 ap-
propriates the budget items to the objects named from the 
effective date. 
Article 6 of the Charter creates the Department of Fi-
nance. The director is the city manager or his appointee. 
His authority is the administration of the city financial 
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affairs (6-4). He is required to control and make expendi-
tures to insure that the budget appropriations are not ex-
ceeded ( 6-4 ( 3) ) . All officeTs and departments of the city 
are prohibited from making expenditures exceeding amounts 
appropriated by the Charter, and serious penalties for vio-
lations are attached ( 6-9) . 
Article 7 of the Charter creates the Department of 
Personnel, the pertinent sections of which are as follows: 
"7-1. Appointments and promotions in the ad-
ministrative service of the city shall be made accord-
ing to merit and fitness to be ascertained, so far as 
practicable, by competitive examination. To carry out 
this purpose, there shall be a department of personnel, 
the head of which shall be the personnel director, who 
shall be appointed by the city manager; unless the 
manager himself assumes the duties of the personnel 
director.'' 
"7 -2. The personnel director shall have power 
and shall be required to: * * * 
" ( 4) Prepare, install, and maintain a classifica-
tion plan based on the duties, authority, and responsi-
bility of positions in the city service; 
'' (5) Prepare and maintain a pay plan in the city 
service; 
'' ( 6) Establish and maintain a roster of all per-
sons in the municipal service in which there shall be 
set forth, as to each officer and employee, (a) the class 
title of the position held, (b) salary or pay, (c) any 
changes in class title, pay, or status, (d) such other 
data as may be deemed desirable or useful to produce 
significant facts pertaining to personnel administra-
tion; • • •" 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
The council shall appoint a civil service commission, con-
sisting of three members, and the manner of their ap-
pointment and their terms of office are set forth (7-3); their 
qualifications and non-partisanship are stressed (7 -4) ; their 
compensation provided for (7-5); and powers and duties 
enumerated ( 7-6) . 
Section 7-7 ( 1) provides that the first director, as soon 
as practicable after his appointment shall prepare and 
recommend to the com~mission such rules as he may con-
sider necessary, appropriate, or desirable to carry out the 
provisions of Article 7. The manner of the adoption of such 
rules and their subsequent amendment and enforcement 
is provided for in this sub-section. 
"(2) Rules adopted hereunder shall have the 
force and effect of law. They shall proi\Tide for the 
method of holding competitive examinations, the es-
tablishment, maintenance, consolidation, and cancel-
lation of eligible lists, administration of the classifica-
tion plan and the pay plan, the application of service 
ratings, the hours of work, attendance regulation and 
leaves of absence for employees in the classified ser-
vice, the order and manner in which lay-offs shall ~be 
effected, and similar matters of personnel administra-
tion·" 
' 
"(3) The powers herein ,conferred upon the di-
rector shall be subject only to the provisions of this 
article and of the rules adopted hereunder, and may 
·be exercised by regulation or by order as the director 
sees fit.'' 
The civil service of the city shall be divided into the un-
classified and the classified service and the positions in-
cluded in each are set forth ( 7-8) . The director shall pre-
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pare an up-to-date record of the authority, duties, and re-
sponsibilities of each position in the classified service. A 
classification plan grading all positions according to simi-
larity of authority, duties and responsibilities shall be sub-
mitted by the director to the city manager· and by the city 
manager to the council (7-9(1)). As promptly as prac-
ticable after the adoption of the classification plan the di-
rector shall allocate each position of the classified service 
to the appropriate class therein on the basis of its author-
ity, duties, and responsibilities (7-9(3)). Vacancies in high-
er positions shall be filled from lower classes, promotions 
following competitive tests (7-10). The director, city 
manager, and the council are each mandated to perform 
the salary fixing functions contained in 7-11 as follows: 
"The personnel director shall prepare for the city 
manager a standard schedule of pay for each position 
in the classified service. The City manager shall sub-
mit the pay plan to the council with such changes as 
he deems desirable, and such plan shall take effect 
when adopted by the council or on the thirtieth day 
after it is submitted if prior thereto the council has 
not disapproved it by resolution. The pay plan adop-
ted by the council shall include a minimum and maxi-
mum and such intermediate rates as may be deemed 
desirable for each class or position. Amendments to 
the pay plan may be adopted by the council from time 
to time upon recommendation of the city manager. 
In increasing or decreasing items in the city budget, 
the council shall not increase or decrease any indi-
vidual salary items but shall act solely with respect 
to classes of positions as established in the classifica-
tion and pay plans. In no event shall the council re-
duce the salary of a class below the minimum or raise 
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it above the maximwn salary established by the pay 
plan except by amendment of the pay plan." 
There is reserved to the police and fire department em-
ployees the state pension and retirement systems already 
estaJblished by general law (7-12(1)) and (2). The civil 
service commission is given the power to administer oaths 
for the purpose of facilitating th~ administration of the 
act ( 7-13) . Prohibitions against the commission are pro-
vided in dealing with the personnel of the city and penal-
ties in case of violation (7 -14). 
By adopting this charter Provo citizens have created 
constitutionally a home-rule charter city. The Charter, 
in the words of Section 5 of Article XI of the Utah Consti-
tution, has "become an organic law of such city, . . 
and shall supercede . . . all laws affecting the or-
ganization and government of such city which are now in 
conflict therewith.'' 
Under the Charter the powers of the city flow to it 
directly from the Constitution. This Court, in Wadsworth 
vs. Santaquin City, 83 U. 321, 28 P2d 161, in construing 
this constitutional provision, expressed the concept as fol-
lows, at 168 Pac. Report: 
"The power granted by the constitutional pro~­
sion to ·chartered cities is no greater than that pos-
sessed by the Legislature and which it may, i.f it sees 
fit, confer on unchartered ·municipalities by general 
law. The difference is that, when a city adopts its 
charter pursuant to the amendment, then the powers 
which it may exercise are directly conferred iby the 
Constitution, and may not be controlled by the Legis-
lature, except as to those matters and things reserved 
to the Legislature by the Constitution. . . ." 
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See also: 2 McQuillin Municipal Corporations (3rd 
Ed.) Sec. 9.03, p. 467, at pp. 468-9. 
This organic law confers on and defines the powers 
of the council and separates same into legislative and ad-
ministrative functions. It specifically provides (1-2) that 
such po·wers shall be exercised "in the manner prescribed 
by the charter," or by ordinance if the manner is not so 
prescribed. The Charter itself (7-11) places the power to 
fix salaries of ·city employees in the classified service in the 
personnel director, the civil service commission, and the 
city manager. The provisions of this, as well as other sec-
tions of Article 7, clearly make the establishment of sal-
aries an administrative matter. It is true that the coun-
cil can adopt or disapprove the pay plan by resolution, but 
the plan can also take effect without council action. Also, 
on recommendation of the city manager the pay plan may 
be amended by the council. The council is prohibited from 
increasing or decreasing the budget items respecting sal-
aries on any basis other than "classes of positions as es-
tablished in the classification and pay plans." Also, the 
council is enjoined from increasing or reducing salaries 
above or below the maximum or minimum established by 
the plan \Vithout an amendment in respect to which the 
city manager has the power of recommendation. 
Thus, by the charter organic law, the citizens of Provo 
have themselves provided for the fixing of salaries of city 
employees, and have specified the manner in which it is 
to be done. Such action is to be carried out by the city 
manager, personnel director, and council, whose functions 
in that connection are clearly made administrative. Thus, 
the said charter provisions respecting salary fixing are the 
law made by the people of Provo by adopting the Charter. 
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This is a legislative act. The carrying out of said provi-
sions in establishing the salaries is left to the aforesaid offi-
cers and the council and the action in so doing is purely 
administrative. In Keigley vs. Bench, supra, this Court 
discussed the matter of a test which determines whether 
or not particular action is legislative or administrative as 
follows, pp. 761-762 A. L. R.: 
". . . Numerous cases have laid down general 
tests for the distinction between legislative and admin-
istrative ordinances. . the general tests are 
such as these: 
'The crucial test for determining what is legisla-
tive and what is administrative is whether the ordi-
nance is one making a new law, or one executing a law 
already in existence.' Whitbeck v. Funk, (140 Or. 70, 
12 P. 2d 1020). 
'The general rule has been stated as follows: 'Acts 
constituting a declaration of public purposes and mak-
ing provisions of ways and means of accomplishment 
may be generally classified as calling for the exercise 
of legislative power.' 43 C. J. 585.' State v. Charles, 
(136 Kan. 875, 18 P.2d 150). 
'In determining whether the ordinance in ques-
tion was legislative or administrative, we notice that 
the authorities in the books are in accord that actions 
which relate to subjects of a permanent or general 
-character are considered to be legislative, while those 
which are temporary in operation and effect are not.' 
Monahan v. Funk, (1317 Or. 580, 3 P.2d 779) ." 
From these tests which the Keigley case approves, the 
said provisions of the Charter itself constitute the general 
permanent law, while the means of carrying out that law 
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by the officers of the city and the council are administra-
tive. 
A good case in point in this connection is Simpson vs. 
Rite, supra, which was an original proceeding by Simp-
son against Rite, registrar of voters of Los Angeles for 
a peremptory writ of mandate directing respondent to omit 
from the ballot a proposed initiative ordinance providing 
for repeal of resolutions of Los Angeles County board of 
supervisors which designated, and pursuant to which the 
county had acquired, a site for municipal and superior court 
building and for designation of a different site. The Su-
preme Court held that the proposed initiative ordinance 
dealt with adminisrative matters whi·ch, under state law, 
were committed solely to the board of supervisors, and that, 
therefore, the ordinance was not within the initiative func-
tion of the law. A peremptory writ of mandate was awar-
ded. The board of county supervisors of Los Angeles Coun-
ty was required by the state law to select and establish a 
site for superior and municipal courts. The phrase of the 
state law was ''suitable quarters.'' The board had done this 
in accordance with law and acquired a site and expended 
large sums of money in the erection of the court building. 
The initiated ordinance seeks to submit the matter of 
where the site shall be to the people. The court had this 
proposition before it for decision: 
"Under the circumstances of this case, are these 
matters within the reach of the initiative?" 
It should be noted that this is a Supreme Court deci-
sion, whereas the others considered above are District Court 
decisions, and the court holds that this matter was admin-
istrative and therefore not referable to the people by the 
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initiative procedures. This holding is embodied in the fol-
lowing language at page 228, Pac. Report: 
"It seems obvious beyond the reach of serious ar-
gument that the board of supervisors cannot perform 
the duty of providing 'suitable quarters' for the courts 
without selecting and designating the sites of the buil-
dings to house the courts, as well as the character and 
size of the building. -The determination of what is 
'suitable' as quarters for the courts necessarily includes 
the selection of a site as well as ascertainment of the 
extent and character of accommodations which a buil-
ding or buildings must contain. Prescribing the policy 
and duty was the legislative act of the state; carrying 
out the policy by performing the duty is an adminis-
trative function delegated by the state to the local gov-
erning body, the board of supervisors. 'The govern-
ing body of the (local political subdivision) * * * by 
its resolution did not make a law but thereby acted in 
an executive or administrative capacity as an instru-
mentality of the state to make operative the provisions 
of a state law already existing.' (citing cases) " 
"Here the state has acted to establish the basic 
policy and has vested the responsibility for carrying 
out that policy in a hoard of supervisors. The steps 
which the board has taken to carry out the state policy 
-the determination that for 'suitaJble quarters' it was 
necessary or expedient to erect new buildings rather 
than to continue to use existing buildings, the fixing 
of sites for the buildings to make them convenient for 
the purpose to be served, the determination of the size 
of the buildings, the arrangement of space therein to 
provide court rooms, jury rooms, judges' chambers 
and all the other details which enter into implement-
ing the legislative act of the state-viewed as parts 
of the entire project, are all inextricably woven and re-
lated. We are satisfied that, regardless of what might 
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be the character of a particu1ar step in another context, 
such steps appear here, in the respects in which they 
are sought to be interrupted and repealed or controlled 
by the initiative ordinance, to be predominantly and 
controllingly administrative in character." 
We believe that the Provo City Charter in Article 7 
thereof, is the law made by the people of Provo on the mat-
ter of fixing salaries of city employees, and this is legisla-
tive. The ·manner and means of carrying out this legisla-
tive enactment by the said city officers and the council is 
administrative. It is our position that the only way it can 
be changed is by amendment of the charter in accordance 
with Section 11-10 thereof, which re-enacts the constitu-
tional provision to the same effect. It seems to us that the 
reasoning in Simpson vs. Hite, supra, is conclusive of the 
matter. 
POINT IV 
THE ATTEMPT MADE BY THE PROPOSED ORDI-
NANCE TO RAISE THE SALARIES OF THE POLICE 
AND FIREMEN OF PROVO CITY, WITHOUT FIRST 
COMPLYING WITH ARTICLE 7 OF THE PROVO CITY 
CHARTER, CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK 
UPON THE CHARTER WHICH IS THE ORGANIC LAW 
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PROVO CITY. 
Attention is called to tlle fact that the proposed ordi-
nance does not attempt to amend the Provo City Charter. 
Petitioners have proceeded in that connection as though 
the people of Provo had not adopted the Charter. How-
ever, they do invoke Section 7-10 of the Charter as au-
thority for their procedure, 'but without first complying 
with the terms of Article 7. Their action in so doing brings 
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them squarely within the doctrine of the case of Dewey, 
et al, vs. Doxey-Layton Realty Company, et al, (1954) 3 
Utah 2d 1, 277 P2d 805. In that case the plaintiff sought 
by initiative ordinance to re-zone certain property in the 
east part of Salt Lake ·City. While the property in ques-
tion was in Salt Lake County, it was zoned so that com-
mercial development was permitted thereon. On its an-
nexation to Salt Lake City the plaintiffs sought by peti-
tion with the city to re-zone the land Residential "A" and 
after a public hearing in accordance with the statute this 
was denied. Thereupon the plaintiffs circulated their initia-
tive petition and filed it with the City Recorder. The de-
fendants then sought a permit to build a service station, 
which was granted by the city officials. The plaintiffs 
sued for an injunction against the defendants building their 
service station, pending the outcome of the plaintiffs' initia-
tive proceeding ·and a judicial declaration that the defend-
ants, if the decision was against them, would acquire no 
property rights if they continued to build before the out-
come of the initiative election was determined. On mo-
tion of the defendants the District Court dismissed the pe-
tition and this appeal was taken. Plaintiffs contended that 
upon compliance with the provisions of the initiative and 
referendum law they had a right to initiate their re-zoning 
ordinance because it was legislative rather than adminis-
trative. To this contention this C'ourt answered, at page 
3 Utah Report: 
"However, a survey of the cases involving initia-
tive and referendum petitions indicates that the line 
drawn between administrative and legislative functions 
is not the only limitation recognized by the courts as 
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to the applicability of direct legislation to particular 
ordinances." 
The Court then concludes that initiative procedures 
do not apply to re-zoning ordinances, using the following 
language, at pp. 6-7 Utah Report: 
"In the present case, the legislature has delegated 
the power to zone to the legislative bodies of cities and 
towns, so that the need for a comprehensive plan might 
be met, and provided means for the protection of pri-
vate property through notice and public hearings. U. 
C. A. 1953, 10-9-1 ff. Thus, when appellants seek to 
initiate re-zoning within the city without complying 
with the zoning statute, they are, in effect, attacking 
collaterally the very statute under which they claim 
their power to zone. The validity of a zoning statute 
may not be raised in a proceeding before the zoning 
authorities because of their lack of authority to deter-
mine that question and because the applicant may not 
attack the validity of the statute or ordinance under 
which he is seeking relief." 
"Appellants agree that the legislative body of the 
city has broad discretionary powers with regard to 
zoning of the city and that such body could not zone 
without complying with the procedural due process 
afforded by the statute. For the same reason, the 
electors of the city cannot by-pass those provisions of 
the statute as long as the zoning statute remains in 
force. The state legislature has here acted within its 
powers and unless the general law is affected by re-
peal or amendment by the legislature, or by referen-
dum or initiative by the people of the state, the statute 
guides the zoning process of the cities and directs the 
means by which it is to be accomplished." 
By the same token, the electors of the City of Provo 
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cannot by-pass those provisions of the Provo City Char-
ter adopted by them as long as the Charter provisions re-
main in force. Unless and until the charter provisions in 
question have been changed by amendment in one of the 
ways mentioned in Section 11-10 of the Charter, the pro-
visions of Article 7 thereof will guide the salary fixing pro-
cedure of the ·municipal officers of Frovo City, including the 
police and firemen. 
CONCLUSION 
Initiative procedures do not apply in Utah to measures 
which are purely administrative in character. Although 
there is a division of authority, the better reasoned cases 
hold that municipal officers salary fixing ordinances are 
administrative in character and therefore not subject to 
initiative procedures. But it is quite universally held in 
this connection that if the municipality concerned has adop-
ted a home-rule charter, the provisions thereof will prevail 
on the question of whether the salary ordinance is adminis-
trative or legislative. 
Provo citizens have adopted a home-rule ·charter under 
the Utah Constitution, and same has become the organic 
law of municipal government in Provo. The Charter pro-
visions have established the law with respect to the fixing 
of salaries for the officers and employees of Provo. The 
manner of caiTying out the law by the administrative offi-
cers and the ·council of the city are clearly defined. Be-
cause these charter provisions make salary fixing adminis-
trative action, the proposed ordinance cannot be submitted 
to the electorate via the initiative law. 
Furthermore, the proposed ordinance constitutes an 
attempt to attack the provisions of the Charter collaterally, 
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and to by-pass the salary fixing provisions thereof. Such 
action cannot be legally taken short of amending the Char-
ter. 
We conclude that the initiative and referendum law 
of Utah is inapplicable to the proposed ordinance. Were-
spectfully urge that this Court recall and discharge the 
alternative writ heretofore issued herein, and to deny the 
issuance of the peremptory writ sought. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE S. BALLIF 
GEORGE E. BALLIF 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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